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The “Democratization” of 
China’s Laws and Policies
Two steps forward one step back 
from Reform and Tiananmen 
to Falun Gong
ONLY	A	FEW	YEARS	AGO,	the	idea	of	putting	“China”	and	“democra-
cy”	together	in	the	same	sentence	would	have	been	inconceivable	to	
many.	Nowadays	“Democratization”	is	a	term	made	more	applicable	
to	China,	due	 to	 the	uncoupling	of	democracy	 from	solely	 the	 idea	
of	direct	political	participation	and	elections.	To	even	begin	speaking	
about	democratic	practice	in	China,	it	must	be	acknowledged	that:	)	
the	protection	of	fundamental	freedoms	is	a	step	in	the	direction	of	
democratic	practice,	and	)	democracy	in	an	authoritarian,	one-party	
state	must	begin	with	limiting	state	power	and	establishing	the	rule	
of	law.	
The	aim	of	this	paper	is	to	discuss	the	“democratization”	of	China	
primarily	as	a	function	of	the	aforementioned	endogenous	changes,	as	
well	as,	less	crucially,	exogenous	pressures,	that	began	as	ideas	to	pre-
	 	Guillermo	O’Donnell	for	one	has	proposed	that	a	mature	democracy	is	not	just	
about	elections	and	the	goal	for	political	development	is	not	simply	to	institutional-
ize	competitive	elections.	Rather,	just	as	important	are	elements	of	the	protection	of	
individual	rights,	and	the	limitations	of	state	power.	See	Guillermo	O’Donnell,	“Hori-
zontal	accountability	in	new	democracies”	in	Andreas	Scheduler,	Larry	Diamond	and	
Marc	F.	Platter	(ends),	The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New 
Democracies	(Boulder,	CO:	Lynne	Reiner	Publishers,	999),	pp	9-5.
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vent	another	Cultural	Revolution	disaster.	Changes	in	ideas	of	“demo-
cratization”	in	China	can	be	traced	through	an	examination	of	emer-
gent	ideas	of	state	power	versus	people’s	interests	in	China,	as	has	been	
debated	in	intellectual	circles.	It	will	also	be	suggested	that	the	real	test	
of	 the	progress	of	democratic	practice	 in	China	was	the	Communist	
Party	of	China’s	(CCP)	response	to	the	recent	Falun	Gong	issue.	The	
thesis	presented	in	this	paper	proposes	that	using	the	above	definition,	
China	has	made	a	great	leap	forward	in	democratic	practice,	especially	
after	the	Tiennamen	incident	in	June	99.	However,	this	progress	has	
taken	a	major	step	back	with	the	handling	of	the	Falun	Gong	crisis.
Significant Ideas that Began Chinese Democratization 
after the Cultural Revolution
While	 exogenous	 forces	 have	 played	 their	 part	 in	 pressuring	China	
towards	democratization	--	not	the	least	of	which	was	the		million	
US	dollars	of	state	funding	in	005-6	dedicated	to	the	task,	and	the	
requirements	of	conforming	to	the	norms	of	international	institutio-
ns	such	as	the	World	Trade	Organization	(WTO)	--	the	beginnings	of	
China’s	democratization	were	endogenous	in	nature.	The	milestones	
that	chart	the	progression	of	ideas	of	democracy	include	what	Minxin	
Pei	termed	in	995	as	“three	mini-waves	of	spontaneous	pro-democra-
cy	activity”.	These	include	the	Democracy	Wall	movement	of	97-79,	
the	 student	 demonstrations	 of	 96-7,	 and	 the	Tiennamen	Square	
movement	of	4	June	99.	More	recently,	the	internationalization	of	
the	Falun	Gong	issue	in	China	has	been	another	test	of	China’s	fled-
gling	pro-democratic	processes.	
Events	in	the	late	970s,	combined	with	a	driving	need	to	learn	
from	the	Cultural	Revolution	disaster,	led	Chinese	intellectuals	in	the	
90s	 to	become	preoccupied	with	 the	 issue	of	political	 reform.	Yi-
jiang	Ding	sums	up	the	main	intellectual	contentions	of	that	time	in	
this	way:	
“In	 the	early	90s,	 the	nature	of	 the	 socialist	 society	and	 the	basic	
functions	of	the	socialist	state	began	to	be	raised	as	issues	in	the	scho-
larly	discussions.	The	disappearance	of	the	enemy	classes	triggered	a	
series	of	theoretical	developments.	‘The	people’	changed	from	a	social	
class	 to	a	nearly	all-inclusive	group,	which	was	 identical	 to	 ‘society’.	
Class	struggle	was	replaced	by	‘contradictions	among	the	people’	as	the	
main	dynamic	for	social	change”.	
	 	See	Minxin	Pei,	 “‘Creeping	Democratization’	 in	China”,	Journal of Democracy,	
Vol.	6,	4(995):65-79,	p	67.
	 	 Yijiang	 Ding,	 Chinese Democracy after Tiennamen	 (Vancouver,	 Toronto:	 UBC	
Press,	00),	p	9.
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This	radical	change	--	from	seeing	the	population	as	a	homogeneous	
social	class	to	a	heterogeneous	social	group	with	differentiated	inter-
ests	--	consequently	changed	the	primary	function	of	the	state	from	
“dictatorship	over	the	enemies	to	managing	public	affairs	for	the	who-
le	society”.4
Several	key	ideas	sparked	during	this	period	of	intellectual	deba-
te	are	worth	highlighting.	Firstly,	intellectual	debate	in	the	late	90s	
focused	 on	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 changing	 function	 of	 the	 government,	
leading	to	a	call	to	give	power	back	to	society,	and	to	the	important	
concept	of	“small	government	and	big	society”	(xiao zhengfu, da she-
hui).	A	prominent	example	of	how	this	 intellectual	discussion	was	
paralleled	in	policy	was	the	government’s	decision	to	make	Hainan	
Province,	then	known	as	Hainan	Dao,	into	a	Special	Economic	Zone,	
where	certain	limitations	of	governance	and	special	freedoms	were	
put	in	place.5
Secondly,	the	prominent	ideas	in	the	90s	were	not	only	that	the	
state	and	 the	people	 should	be	differentiated,	but	 that	 the	 interests	
of	 the	people	may	not	be	as	unified	as	once	 thought.	As	a	 result	of	
increasing	pressure	 from	intellectual	circles,	 the	Communist	Party’s	
Central	Committee	was	forced	to	acknowledge	that	within	the	various	
social	groups	that	existed	among	the	peoples	and	regions,	there	exis-
ted	“a	certain	lack	of	complete	unity	of	interests”.	This	was,	in	fact,	an	
admission	that	Stalin’s	assumption	that	a	highly	unified	state	without	
conflicts	of	social	interest	could	be	realized,	once	the	“enemy	classes”	
had	been	eliminated,	was	an	erroneous	one.
The	birth	of	the	concept	of	the	limitation	of	state	power,	and	the	
idea	that	the	people	themselves	may	have	different	and	conflicting	in-
terests,	created	a	vacuum	into	which	the	development	of	civil	society	
and	the	rule	of	law	fit	perfectly.
Recent Progress in Democratic Practice: Freedom of 
Association and Civil Society in China
The	 coming	 into	 power	 of	 the	 Chinese	 Communist	 Party	 (CCP)	 in	
949	brought	 into	being	 socialist	 public	 ownership,	 a	 planned	 eco-
nomy	and	a	highly	structured	and	centralized	administrative	system.	
This	effectively	snuffed	out	most	of	the	civil	organizations	which	had	
been	established	prior	to	949,	such	as	clansmen’s	associations,	an-
cestral	halls	and	civil	corps.	The	only	ones	that	remained	were	those	
that	were	of	use	 to	 the	CCP	and,	of	course,	 the	mass	organizations	
4	 	Ibid.
5	 	For	more	detail,	see	Gao	Changyun	and	Shi	Yuan	“The	Hainan	Model	of	‘Small	
Government	and	Big	Society”,	Hainan Kaifa Bao,		Sept	99.	
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which	the	CCP	itself	set	up,	like	the	trade	unions,	and	those	set	up	for	
the	youth.6
The	recent	resurgence	of	civil	society	in	China	has	been	attributed	
to	the	deliberate	“reorganization	of	society”	necessitated	by	economic	
reform	and	development.	This	has	led	to	“the	erosion	of	the	work	unit	
systems	as	a	form	of	social	organization	within	the	state’s	vertical	con-
trol	structure”	as	more	and	more	workers	left	the	state	sector	for	the	
non-state	 sector.7	 Instead,	 this	 vertical	 structure	 has	 been	 replaced	
by	horizontal	groupings	in	associational	activities,	which	have	been	
created	to	fill	the	need	for	new	group	identities	and	interests,	such	as	
those	resulting	from	the	migration	of	peoples	from	different	regions	
in	China.	
The	exponential	growth	of	civil	society	in	China	may	be	likened	to	
the	onset	of	plant	growth	in	a	forest	after	a	drought	is	broken	by	the	
first	rains.	From	a	dismal	44	national	associations	in	the	950s,	the	
number	of	national	associations	in	existence	in	China	rose	sharply	to	
,600,	along	with	,000	local	associations.	And	while	the	Tiennamen	
incident	of	99	took	its	toll	on	the	growth	of	civil	society,	in	004,	the-
re	were	,96	associations	registered,	and	in	006,	7,000.	Some	
estimate	 that	 there	 could	 be	 as	many	 as	 	million	 unregistered	 as-
sociations	 in	China	 today.	 The	 recognition	 of	 the	 need	 for	 a	more	
robust	civil	society	may	have	emerged	from	an	endogenous	appraisal	
of	 the	Tiennamen	crisis	 itself,	given	 that	afterwards	a	more	“positi-
ve	interaction”	between	state	and	society	was	recommended,	and	the	
two-step	development	of	civil	society	was	the	path	suggested	by	cer-
tain	intellectuals	in	China.	In	this	model,	civil	society	would	develop	
at	first	in	the	private	sphere	and	then	expand	into	the	public	sphere,	
potentially	 enabling	 a	 tentative	 step	 towards	 “democratic	 politics”.9	
It	is	important	to	note	that	while	the	most	obvious	driver	for	the	esta-
blishment	of	civil	society	in	China	is	economic	reform,	the	existence	
of	a	climate	of	political	tolerance	that	supports	such	change	cannot	be	
underestimated.
6	 	See	Keping	Yu,	“Changes	in	Civil	Organizations	and	Governance	in	China’s	Rural	
Areas:	A	Case	Study	of	Dongsheng	Village,	Changqiao	Town,	Zhangpu	County,	Fujian	
Province”,	000.	China	Centre	for	Comparative	Politics	&	Economics.	Available	at	
http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/civsoc/final/china/chn.doc
7	 	Ding,	Chinese Democracy after Tiennamen,	pp	49-50.
	 	Ying	Ma,	“China’s	Stubborn	Anti-Democracy”,	American	Enterprise	Institute	for	
Public	Policy	Research,		Feb	007.	Available	at	http://www.aei.org/publications/fil-
ter.all,pubID.566/pub_detail.asp
9	 	Deng	Zhenglai	and	Jing	Yuejing,	“Building	Civil	Society	in	China”,	cited	in	Ding,	
Chinese Democracy after Tiennamen,	p	7.
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Civil Society Entrenched in Chinese
Laws and Policies
A	significant	indicator	of	progress	toward	a	truly	legitimate	civil	
society	in	China	has	been	the	legal	reforms	that	have	taken	place	with	
respect	to	Chinese	people’s	freedom	of	association.	While	this	is	a	rig-
ht	theoretically	guaranteed		to	every	Chinese	citizen	under	the	Cons-
titution,	in	practice	approval	for	exercising	his	right	has	been	difficult	
to	 come	by.	Since	 the	 revival	 of	discussions	on	 civil	 society,	 salient	
changes	have	taken	place	in	a	positive	direction.
The	 new	understanding	 of	 people’s	 differentiated	 interests	 that	
began	in	the	90s	has	in	fact	led	to	concrete	changes	in	the	law.	Many	
of	 the	prohibitions	 that	 accompanied	 the	CCP’s	 coming	 into	power	
have	been	lifted.	Previously,	in	950	and	95,	two	sets	of	rules	and	re-
gulations	were	put	in	place	by	the	Government	Administration	Coun-
cil	and	the	Ministry	of	Internal	Affairs.	These	were	the	“Interim	Regu-
lations	on	Registration	of	Social	Associations”	and	the	“Detailed	Rules	
for	Implementation	of	the	Regulations”	respectively.	These	rules	and	
regulations	were	explicitly	designed	to	examine	existing	civil	associa-
tions,	banning	those	that	were	not	favorable	to	the	Communist	admi-
nistration,	and	putting	those	that	were	useful	under	the	management	
of	government	departments.	However,	the	basic	underlying	policy	was	
to	suppress	the	development	of	civil	and	social	associations.0
In	contrast,	in	June	99,	the	“Bureau	for	the	Management	of	Civil	
Organizations”	was	set	up,	officially	recognizing	the	existence	of	civil	
society	in	China.	Similarly,	the	“Regulations	on	the	Administration	and	
Registration	of	Social	Associations”	that	were	put	in	place	in	99	by	
the	State	Council	--	a	revised	version	of	the	regulations	promulgated	in	
99	--	were	established	alongside	“Regulations	on	Management	of	Ci-
vilian-run	Non-enterprise	Units”.	While	the	regulations	remained	strin-
gent,	 this	acceptance	of	non-government	controlled	associations	was	
one	more	landmark	event	for	civil	society	in	China,	as	it	formally	trans-
formed	the	strict	government-controlled	system	of	the	administration	
of	civil	organizations	to	allow	for	more	autonomous	associations.
There	now	exists	in	China	roughly	three	kinds	of	civil	organizatio-
ns	in	two	distinct	categories.	The	first	category	includes	the	“official”	
organizations,	which	are	government-run,	and	the	“semi-official”	or-
ganizations.	The	semantic	differences	between	these	two	types	of	or-
0	 	Liu	Junning,	“Civil	Society	and	Limited	Government	–	Take	Chinese	Chambers	of	
Commerce	for	Example”,	000,	Research	Report.	Available	at	http://www.ids.ac.uk/
ids/civsoc/final/china/chn.doc
	 	The	delineation	of	“official”,	“semi-official”	and	“popular”	associations	has	been	
discussed	in,	for	example,	Wang	Ying,	“The	Intermediary	Level	of	Chinese	Society:	
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ganizations	are	often	negligible	because	the	government	department	
appointed	 to	 supervise	 these	 “official”	 and	 “semi-official”	 organiza-
tions	or	associations	often	has	the	power	to	unilaterally	appoint	(or	
dismiss)	the	leaders	of	these	organizations,	and	often	exerts	control	
over	the	organization’s	activities.	A	large	percentage	of	these	contro-
lled	associations	have	a	political	and	/or	economic	function,	such	as	
the	Communist	Youth	League,	the	Private	Entrepreneurs’	Association	
and	the	Trade	Union.
Of	more	 interest	 to	 this	 analysis	of	democratic	practice	 are	 the	
“popular	associations”	which,	in	practice,	enjoy	a	high	degree	of	au-
tonomy.	Moreover,	the	erosion	of	government	control	at		the	township	
level	makes	it	possible	for	even	the	organizations	designated	as	“semi-
official”	to,	at	this	level,	enjoy	a	greater	degree	of	freedom	along	with	
the	“popular”	associations.	While	many	of	the	“popular”	organizations	
are	viewed	as	less	of	a	“risk”	to	political	stability	because	their	primary	
function	is	cultural	or	intellectual,	even	economic-cum-political	asso-
ciations	in	some	smaller	states	and	counties	now	have	the	freedom	to	
voice	the	interests	of	their	members.	These	new	freedoms	given	to	ci-
vil	society	in	China	have	also	meant	an	unprecedented	increase	in	citi-
zen	protests	--	a	phenomenon	that	would	have	been	severely	punished	
prior	 to	 this	 transformation.	 From	 the	mid-990s	 onwards,	 the	 rise	
of	protests	in	China	has	been	well-documented.	The	Chinese	Ministry	
of	Public	Security	reported	0,000	protests	throughout	the	country	in	
994,	5,000	protests	in	00,	74,000	in	004,	and	7,000	in	005.	Or-
dinary	citizens	now	have	more	wherewithal	to	demand	that	the	central	
government	to	address	their	grievances	on	everything	from	corruption	
to	poor	health	care.	In	004,	0	million	petitions	were	filed	requesting	
intervention	from	Beijing;	in	005,	this	number	rose	to	0	million.
Furthermore,	 in	many	 cases,	 civil	 organizations	 now	 have	 the	
autonomy	not	only	to	encourage	their	members’	active	participation	
in	the	internal	issues	of	the	organization	or	association,	but	there	is	
also	a	growing	awareness	of	the	relevance	of	political	issues	and	the	
motivation	for	members	to	participate	in	such	issues.	This	has	led	to	
increased	participation	 in	elections	at	grassroots	 levels	and	 in	rural	
Development	 of	 Associations	 and	 the	 Rebuilding	 of	 the	 Organizational	 System”,	
Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Jikan	(Chinese	Social	Science	Quarterly),	no.	6	(994),	p	5.
	 	Christopher	E.	Nevitt,	“Private	Business	Associations	in	China:	Evidence	of	Civil	
Society	or	Local	State	Power?”,	The China Journal,	no.	6	(July	996):5-4.
	 	Statistics	from	Ying	Ma,	“China’s	Stubborn	Anti-Democracy”,	American	Enter-
prise	Institute	for	Public	Policy	Research,		Feb	007.	It	is	no	wonder	that	the	Chi-
nese	government	now	fears	“participation	crises”.	In	time	this	may	prove	a	real	bar-
rier	to	further	political	liberation.
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areas.	The	extent	to	which	members	of	organizations	are	encouraged	
to	participate	in	elections	includes	compensations	and	subsidies	pro-
vided	by	the	organization	for	such	political	participation.	The	success	
of	these	methods	is	evident	in	the	fact	that	in	rural	areas,	95%	partici-
pation	in	elections	is	often	achieved.4	The	idea	of	grassroots	elections	
will	be	further	examined	later	on	in	this	paper.
Further Progress in Democratic Practice:
Significant Steps towards Rule of Law
and Human Rights in China 
Other	 encouraging	 evidence	 of	 positive	 change	 in	 the	 democratic	
practice	 in	China	 has	 been	 the	 establishment	 and	 strengthening	 of	
rule	of	law.	Franz	Michael	has	this	to	say	about	the	concept	of	the	rule	
of	law:	
In	the	Western	legal	tradition,	law	is	applied	equally	to	all;	it	is	binding	
on	the	lawgiver	and	is	meant	to	prevent	arbitrary	action	by	the	ruler.	
Law	guarantees	a	realm	of	freedom	for	the	members	of	a	political	com-
munity	 that	 is	 essential	 to	 the	protection	of	 life	 and	human	dignity	
against	tyrannical	oppression…5
The	idea	of	the	rule	of	law	is	very	much	a	Western	concept	whose	
main	purpose	is	to	regulate	the	behaviours	of	individuals	in	general,	
and	 government	 officials	 in	 particular,	 by	 prohibiting	 the	 abuse	 of	
power.	The	rule	of	law	implicitly	assumes	the	existence	of	human	rig-
hts,	increasing	the	power	of	the	individual	over	that	of	the	state.	Howe-
ver,	this	is	a	clear	juxtaposition	to	traditional	Chinese	legal	thought,	
where	an	instrumental	approach	to	law	predominated	--	the	law	was	
a	tool	through	which	the	government	ruled	the	governed.	Moreover,	
in	traditional	Chinese	thought,	the	Emperor	(or	party	leader)	was	hi-
mself	above	the	law,	and	indeed	his	every	decree	or	wish	was	the	law	
itself.	 Inherent	 in	 the	Chinese	Socialist	concept	of	 law	and	zheng-fa 
xitong,	there	is	the	idea	of	linghouxing	or	flexibility,	which	allows	the	
state,	or	more	specifically,	the	state	leader	to	interpret	the	law	(most	
often	according	to	his	own	or	his	party’s	interests).
		 The	recent	push	for	the	establishment	of	the	rule	of	law	in	Chi-
na	that	leans	more	towards	the	Western	concept	is	driven	both	exoge-
nously	and	endogenously	by	the	economic	imperative.	To	begin	with,	
4	 	See	Yu	Keping,	“The	Emergence	of	Chinese	Civil	Society	and	Its	Significance	to	
Governance”,	000.	Available	at	www.ids.ac.uk/ids/civsoc/final/china/chn.doc
5	 	Franz	Michael,	“Law:	A	Tool	of	Power”	in	Yuan-Li	Wu	et	al.	Human Rights in the 
People’s Republic of China	(Boulder,	CO:	Westview	Press,	9),	-55,	p	.
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favoring	a	market	economy	over	the	previous	planned	system	meant	
that	laws	became	increasing	vital	in	regulating	China’s	economic	acti-
vities.	Furthermore,	the	central	government	was	forced	to	devolve	fi-
nancial	and	fiscal	power,	property	rights	and	the	material	allocation	of	
power	to	local	governments	and	individuals.6	At	the	same	time,	with	
the	new	open-door	policy	came	the	need	to	attract	foreign	investment	
and	the	confidence	of	foreign	investors	had	to	be	won	by	establishing	
an	impartial	and	consistent	legal	system.	The	opening	up	of	the	eco-
nomy	to	the	international	community	is	indeed	a	two-way	street,	and	
the	established	market	economies	of	the	West,	to	which	China	dearly	
wished	to	have	economic	ties,	also	exerted	external	pressure	on	China	
to	adhere	to	international	norms.	An	example	of	this	is	the	stipulation	
of	a	judicial	review	system7	and	the	changes	in	commercial	laws	and	
practices	 to	which	China	was	 subjected	with	 its	 ascension	 into	 the	
World	Trade	Organization.
From Ideas of Democratization to Its Implementation: 
Legal Reform in China
However,	 given	China’s	 legal	 history,	 the	 recent	 progress	made	 in	
the	rule	of	law	since	the	9	Chinese	Constitution	is	nothing	short	
of	astounding.	This	is	particularly	so	with	regards	to	laws	that	spe-
cifically	curb	the	abuse	of	state	power	over	the	individual.	In	99,	
a	white	paper	was	published	by	the	State	Council	entitled	“The	Si-
tuation	 of	 Human	 Rights	 in	 China”.	 This,	 for	 the	 first	 time,	 was	
a	formal	acknowledgment	of	the	concept	of	Human	Rights	by	the	
Chinese	 government.	 Very	 surprisingly,	 out	 of	 an	 astounding	 49	
laws	passed	in	China	between	99	and	997,	the	Chinese	gover-
nment	has	paid	specific	attention	to	the	legal	rights	of	citizens.	For	
example,	October	990	saw	the	enactment	of	the	Administrative	Li-
tigation	Act	which	gave	citizens	legal	recourse	in	the	onset	of	a	State	
abuse	of	power.	 In	May	994,	China	 enacted	 the	State	 Indemnity	
Law,	which	stipulates	that	“where	a	government	agency	or	its	per-
sonnel	invades	the	legitimate	rights	and	interests	of	a	citizen,	legal	
person	or	other	organization,	resulting	in	injury	while	performing	
6	 	 See	 Zheng	Yongnian,	Will China Become Democratic? Elite, Class and Regime 
Transition	(Singapore:	Marshall	Cavendish	International,	004),	p	56.
7	 	For	a	discussion	of	this,	see	Martin	G.	Hu,	“WTO’s	Impact	on	the	Rule	of	Law	in	
China”,	Mansfield	Dialogues	in	Asia,	00.	Available	at	www.mansfieldfdn.org/pro-
grams/program_pdfs/0hu.pdf
	 	From	the	Complete Collection of Laws, Regulations and Rules in China (Beijing:	
Beijing	University	Press	for	The	Center	of	Legal	Information	and	the	Beijing	Zhong-
tian	Software	Company,	997).
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its	functions,	the	sufferer	shall	be	entitled	to	obtain	state	indemni-
ty”.9	Furthermore,	 in	March	996,	China	put	in	place	the	Law	on	
Administrative	Punishments	that	provides	mechanisms	for	investi-
gating	and	punishing	criminal	offenses	that	take	place	not	only	in	
state	administrative,	economic	and	judicial	agencies,	but	those	that	
take	place	within	the	leadership	organs	of	the	CCP	itself.0	Criticis-
ms	of	the	Chinese	legal	system	stating	that	only	half	of	China’s	laws	
were	enforced	have	some	basis	in	truth,	but	nonetheless,	the	enact-
ment	 of	 the	 990	Administrative	Litigation	Act	 produced	 a	 sharp	
increase	of	lawsuits	against	the	Chinese	government	(about	7,000	
a	year	in	the	early	990s),	of	which	the	government’s	decisions	were	
dismissed	in	an	unprecedented	9%	of	the	cases	and	overturned	in	
.%	of	the	cases.	
While	still	very	much	under	fire	from	Human	Rights	watchdogs	
over	the	Tiennamen	incident,	even	these	agencies	have	had	to	admit	
that	the	Chinese	government	has	in	fact,	in	several	instances,	upheld	
the	law	and	human	rights.	In	some	cases,	the	CCP	has		shown	an	im-
proved	treatment	of	political	prisoners.	Significantly,	there	has	been	
no	death	sentence	for	a	political	prisoner	since	the	reform,	which	may	
be	construed	as	an	important	break	from	past	practices.	At	the	same	
time,	997	revisions	to	legislature	abolished	the	“counter-revolutiona-
ry”	offense	from	Chinese	criminal	law,	replacing	it	instead	with	a	new	
crime	that	concerned	state	security.	Both	external	pressures	and	do-
mestic	changes	to	the	legal	system	have	led	to	leniency	with	regards	to	
political	prisoners	from	99.	For	example,	in	July	997,	Tang	Yuan-
juan	and	Li	Wei,	both	of	whom	had	been	convicted	of	political	cri-
mes	for	their	activities	at	the	Tiennamen	protests,	were	released	from	
prison.	The	 Jilin	 provincial	High	Court	 set	 an	 important	 precedent	
by	nullifying	their	conviction	(one	of	two)	for	“counter-revolutionary”	
offenses	 and	 extending	 this	 decision	 to	 two	 other	 prisoners.	 At	 the	
time,	Tang	and	Li	had	already	each	served	an	-year	sentence,	so	the	
overturning	of	the	“counter-revolutionary”	conviction	allowed	them	to	
be	released	without	serving	out	the	rest	of	their	0	and	-year	senten-
ces	respectively.	
9	 	Zhenmin	Wang,	“The	Developing	Rule	of	Law	in	China”,	Harvard Asia Quarterly,	
Vol.	4.	Available	at	http://www.asiaquarterly.com/content/view//40
0	 	Ibid.
	 	Democracy and Law	(Shanghai)	no.		(995),	p	6.
	 	“People’s	Republic	of	China:	Nine	Years	After	Tiananmen	–	Still	a	‘Counter-Revo-
lutionary	Riot’?”	An	Amnesty	International	Report,	7	Nov	99.	Available	at	http://
web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/ASA7099ENGLISH/$File/ASA709.pdf
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The Falun Gong Issue: A Difficult Testing
Ground for Democratic Practice in China
Falun	Gong,	also	known	as	Falun	Dafa,	is	a	Chinese	spiritual	move-
ment	 founded	 in	 99	 by	 Li	Hongzhi	 (95–).	 Avoiding	 a	 religious	
mantle,	Li	and	his	followers	understand	Falun	Gong	as	a	“cultivation	
system,”	 based	 on	 principles	 of	 qigong	 that	 are	 widely	 accepted	 in	
China.	Falun	Gong	rapidly	became	very	popular	in	China,	attracting	
millions	of	followers	in	the	years	immediately	after	its	founding.	Pri-
marily	out	of	fear	of	mass	social	rebellion	and	disorder,	the	CCP	tried	
to	suppress	the	Falun	Gong	movement.	The	issue	came	to	a	head	in	
the	form	of	a	massive	protest	in	Beijing	by	Falun	Gong	practitioners	
on	the	5th	of	April,	999,	which	led	the	Chinese	government	to	take	
even	 stronger	measures	 against	 the	movement,	 unfortunately	using	
the	law	as	a	tool	to	this	end.
The Falun Gong Issue: A retraction of freedom
of association
Under	the	leadership	of	Li	Hongzhi,	the	Falun	Gong	were	care-
ful	not	to	fall	under	the	existing	state	law	on	religion,	given	that	only	
5	major	 religions	were	 sanctioned,	 and	within	 these	 religions,	 only	
certain	practicing	organizations	were	considered	state-approved	and	
properly	registered.	Instead,	the	Falun	Gong	as	a	qigong-related	as-
sociation,	was	in	a	sense	affiliated	with	the	State	Sports	Administra-
tion.	At	the	protest	on	April	5th,	999,	the	Falun	Gong	insisted	on	be-
ing	recognized	as	a	state-sanctioned	association,	and	as	early	as	99,	
The	Qigong	Research	Association	of	China	(QRAC)	issued	the	Beijing	
Falun	Gong	Research	Association	with	a	“QRAC	Accredited	Qigong	
School	Registration	Certificate”	that	given	official	recognition	to	the	
Falun	Gong	Research	Association	as	an	“academic	organization.”	The	
range	of	operations	were	“theoretical	studies	and	research”,	“promo-
ting	practice”,	and	“consultative	services”	throughout	all	of	China.4
Despite	the	new	laws	in	place	that	gave	freer	rein	to	associations,	
as	discussed	earlier,	the	CCP	chose	to	violate	association	regulations	
as	part	of	a	 two-pronged	strategy5	 to	suppress	 the	Falun	Gong.	On	
July	nd,	999,	the	Ministry	of	Civil	Affairs	declared	the	Falun	Gong	
to	 be	 an	 illegal	 organization,	 stipulating	 that	 it	 had	 failed	 to	 regis-
	 	Bryan	Edelman	and	James	T.	Richardson,	“Falun	Gong	and	the	Law:	Develop-
ment	of	Legal	Social	Control	in	China”,	Nova Religio,	Vol.	6,	(00):-,	p	.
4	 	“The	Truth	Behind	the	5	April	Incident	(abridged)”,		Apr	00.	Available	at	
http://www.faluninfo.net/SpecialTopics/april5abridged.html
5	 	The	other	being	the	violation	of	“moral	virtue”	which	will	be	discussed	later	in	
this	paper.
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ter	under	Article	7	of	the	November	99	Regulations	Governing	the	
Registration	and	Administration	of	Public	Organizations.	The	Falun	
Gong	was	also	accused	of	violating	article	9()	of	these	regulations,	
which	forbade	the	creation	of	regional	subsidiaries.6	This	was	further	
endorsed	by	Li	Baoku,	the	Chinese	Deputy	Minister	of	Civil	Affairs,	
who	made	an	official	statement	on	these	violations,	by	the	Falun	Dafa	
Research	Society,	of	regulations	on	registration	within	the	various	le-
vels	of	civil	affairs	organization.
This	was	clearly	a	step	backwards	from	the	legal	developments	that	
had	ensued	post-Tiennamen.	Special	regulations	on	public	organization,	
assembly	and	demonstration	were	passed	by	the	Standing	Committee	
of	the	National	People’s	Congress	on	October	st,	99,	four	months	
after	the	Tiennamen	incident.	This	was	part	of	the	implementation	of	a	
policy	related	to	the	9	State	Constitution’s	provision	on	freedom	of	
association,	which	anticipated	and	even	served	to	encourage	an	increa-
se	 in	social,	economic	and	cultural	activities	pursuant	 to	Deng’s	pro-
gram	that	required	both	the	democratization	and	legalization	of	state	
structures.7	Despite	leaps	in	the	liberalization	of	laws	with	regards	to	
civil	society,	in	the	face	of	a	real	test,	the	Chinese	government	showed	
itself	unable	to	resist	exerting	full	societal	control.
The Falun Gong Issue: A Reversion to State
Instrumentalism in legal interpretation
As	noted	earlier,	the	notion	of	law	in	the	Chinese	legal	tradition	
is	viewed	as	a	tool	by	which	the	emperor	or	party	leader,	who,	being	
himself	 above	 the	 law,	dictates	 to	his	people,	using	 the	 linghuoxing	
of	the	law	to	provided	interpretations	as	he	saw	fit.	The	more	recent	
socialist	framework	of	legality	also	reflects	this	idea.	The	law,	and	the	
Chinese	legal	idea	of	zheng-fa xitong,	rather	than	being	an	overarching	
concept	that	governs	all,	is	instead	an	instrumentalist	tool	by	which	
the	state	imposes	guidelines	of	its	own	interpretation	on	the	people,	so	
as	to	protect	society	from	“spiritual	pollution”	and	“bourgeois	liberali-
zation”,	and	which	also	ends	up	strengthening	its	dictatorship.	
In	an	interview	with	Jiang	Zemin	in	September	99,	he	was	said	
to	have	admitted	that	one	of	the	important	changes	as	a	consequence	
of	 the	99	Tiennamen	Massacre	was	 that	he	had	come	to	recogni-
6	 	“Falungong	ban	supported	by	law”, BR,	Vol.	4	7(999),	p	9.
7	 	“Commentary	views	public	organization	regulations”,	Renmin ribao,	9	Nov	999.	
Cited	in	Roland	C.	Keith	and	Zhiqiu	Lin,	“The	‘Falun Gong	Problem’:	Politics	and	the	
Struggle	for	the	Rule	of	Law	in	China”,	The China Quarterly,	75(00):6-4,	p	65.
	 	Chih-yu	Shih,	Collective Democracy in China	 (Hong	Kong:	Chinese	University	
Press,	999),	pp	40,	-6.
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ze	 the	 need	 for	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 in	China,	 as	 opposed	 to	 traditional	
rule	by	the	CCP	--	rule	of	man.9	This	was	more	evident	through	the	
exponential	increase	in	law	reform	in	the	subsequent	years,	especia-
lly	after	Deng	Xiaoping’s	speeches	demanding	 the	“liberation	of	 the	
mind”	in	99,	which	was	essentially	the	turning	point	that	broke	the	
spell	of	 caution	after	Tiennamen.	However,	 the	arrival	of	 the	Falun	
Gong	situation,	and	the	CCP’s	alarm	at	its	own	difficulties	in	curbing	
its	spreading	popularity,	combined	with	 international	sympathy,	 led	
the	Chinese	government	to	utilize	these	same	laws	to	put	the	brakes	
on	recent	political	freedom.	Jiang	Zemin,	on	January	0th,	00,	once	
again	linked	the	rule	of	law	with	the	traditional	Chinese	“rule	of	man”	
way,	by	stipulating	that	“Ruling	the	country	according	to	law	and	go-
verning	the	country	with	high	morals	complement	and	promote	each	
other.	Neither	 (…)	 should	 be	 overemphasized	 to	 the	 neglect	 of	 the	
other.”0	This	provided	a	morality	grounds	for	interpreting	the	law.
Even	as	early	as	March	999,	the	state	constitution	had	been	re-
vised	 to	give	equal	weight	 to	 the	 rule	of	 law	 (fazhi)	and	 the	 rule	of	
virtue	(dezhi).	This	was	a	crime	of	which	the	Falun	Gong	could	be	
conveniently	accused.	Xia	Yong,	from	the	CASS	Institute	of	Law,	sta-
ted	that:	
…	 the	 ‘Falungong’	 organization	 and	 its	 activities	 have	 harmed	 the	
physical	and	psychological	well-being,	lives	and	security	of	property	of	
‘Falungong’	practitioners…	they	have	used	heresies	such	as…	‘global	
explosion’	to	confuse	practitioners,	thus	causing	some	practitioners	to	
lose	the	ability	to	think,	judge,	and	discriminate	things	normally.	
In	deliberately	casting	the	Falun	Gong	as	a	“heretical	cult”	that	was	
a	danger	to	society,	the	government	was	now	able	to	persecute	Falun	
Gong	 leaders	 and	 practitioners	 as	 having	 violated	 “state	 security”	 -
-	the	new	crime	which	replaced	the	“counter-revolutionary”	crime	in	
the	997	revision	of	Chinese	criminal	law.	While	the	new	997	revi-
sion	had	a	reference	to	“evil	cults”	 in	article	0	 ,	 the	severity	of	 the	
crime	was	open	to	interpretation,	and	this	interpretation,	unfortuna-
tely,	was	provided	by	 the	Supreme	People’s	Court	and	 the	Supreme	
9	 	See	R.C.	Keith,	China’s Struggle for the Rule of Law (London	and	New	York:	Mac-
millan	&	St.	Martin’s,	994),	p	6.
0	 	Jiang	Zemin,	‘On	“Three	Represents”’	(Beijing:	Foreign	Languages	Press,	00),	
p	6.
	 	Roland	C.	Keith	and	Zhiqiu	Lin,	“The	‘Falun Gong	Problem’”,	p	60.
	 	“CASS	Official	Xia	Yong	on	Falungong,	rule	of	law”,	Xinwenshe,	Beijing,		Aug	
999.	Cited	in	Roland	C.	Keith	and	Zhiqiu	Lin,	“The	‘Falun Gong	Problem’”.
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People’s	Procuratorate	on	November	st,	999.	This	stipulated	that	the	
field	of	punishable	behavior	under	article	00	was	expanded	to	inclu-
de	“illegal	groups	that	have	been	found	using	religion,	qigong,	or	other	
things	as	camouflage…	and	deceiving	people	by	molding	and	sprea-
ding	 superstitious	 ideas,	 and	 endangering	 society”.	 Furthermore,	
this	interpretation	refers	to	other	cognate	articles	in	criminal	law,	in	
order	to	invoke	severe	criminal	punishment	rather	than	administrative	
law	punishment.4	
This,	taken	jointly	with	the	hastily	passed	“Decision	on	Banning	
Heretical	Organizations	and	Preventing	and	Punishing	Heretical	Ac-
tivities”	on	October	0th,	999	by	the	Standing	Committee	of	the	Natio-
nal	People’s	Congress,	gave	the	CCP	legal	basis	for	its	persecution	of	
the	Falun	Gong.	It	also	served	to	highlight	China’s	reversion	to	state	
instrumentalism	in	the	interpretation	of	the	law,	in	which	“Party	lea-
dership	continues	as	a	dominant	theme”.5	This	sudden	halt	on	pro-
gress	of	the	rule	of	law	in	China	was	made	more	evident	in	light	of	
the	differential	treatment	of	cases	from	Tiennamen	in	99	and	Falun	
Gong	in	999.	While	many	cases	from	the	Tiennamen	situation	made	
it	 to	court	 (albeit	belatedly),	most	cases	 relating	 to	Falun	Gong	did	
not,	ostensibly	in	a	bid	to	deny	the	Falun	Gong	a	platform	for	further	
publicity.6	
Conclusion: Hope for the Democratization
of China and grassroots elections
Recent	 liberation	 of	 political	 practice	 in	 China	 began	with	 the	
idea	of	the	need	to	set	limitations	on	state	power,	and	was	driven	by	
the	 imperative	of	 economic	 reform	and	opening	up	of	markets.	 In-
deed,	China	has	made	undeniable	progress	both	in	its	legal	and	policy-
making	mechanisms	to	grant	its	citizens	more	freedom	of	association	
and	protection	from	the	abuses	of	state	power,	under	a	vastly	impro-
ved	 rule	of	 law.	However,	when	push	comes	 to	 shove,	 the	CCP	was	
unable	to	see	a	way	to	implement	these	new	democratic	practices	in	
the	light	of	the	“social	threat”	posed	by	the	Falun	Gong.	The	result	of	
this	is	that	China	has	taken	two	steps	forward,	and	then	taken	a	large	
step	backwards	in	the	realization	of	democratic	practices.	
Ironically,	in	spite	of	the	larger	internationalized	issue	of	China’s	
	 	Edelman	and	Richardson,	“Falun	Gong	and	the	Law”,	p	7.
4	 	Roland	C.	Keith	and	Zhiqiu	Lin,	“The	‘Falun Gong	Problem’”,	pp	6-9.
5	 	Pittman	Potter,	The Chinese Legal System: Globalization and Local Legal Culture	
(London	and	New	York:	Routledge,	00),	p	.
6	 	Randall	Peerenboom,	China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law	(Cambridge:	Cam-
bridge	University	Press,	00),	pp	99-0.
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failure	with	regards	to	the	Falun	Gong,	direct	political	participation	
has	 been	 quietly	 flourishing	 at	 the	 grassroots	 level.	 This	 has	 been	
made	possible	as	result	of	the	demise	of	CCP	communes	at	the	local	
level.	A	 99	 internal	State	Council	 report,	which	was	 “leaked”	 to	
the	Hong	Kong	press,	presented	evidence	that	0%	of	the	CCP	cells	
in	rural	China	had	“collapsed”	or	ceased	to	function,	while	another	
60%	of	 these	were	weak	and	barely	 functional.7	This	gap	 in	 rural	
governance	has	been	filled	by	traditional	lineage-based	lines	of	au-
thority	and	spontaneously	formed	village	residents’	associations.	As	
early	as	December	9,	the	revised	Constitution	of	China	gave	legal	
status	to	these	village	residents’	associations	as	grassroots	civic	or-
ganizations.	This	was	followed	by	the	formal	support	of	the	CCP	for	
these	associations,	by	passing	the	Organic	Law	in	97,	which	saw	
two-thirds	of	Chinese	provinces	passing	 local	 legislation	on	village	
residents’	associations.
Moreover,	since	99,	experiments	in	rural	village-level	self-gover-
nance	have	taken	place	in	all	0	Chinese	provinces.	This	sea	of	chan-
ge	in	legislation,	with	the	help	of	the	pro-democratic	activity	of	local	
associations,	 has	been	 accompanied	by	 a	 similar	 transformation	 in	
rural	residents’	views	on	democratic	practice	–	from	initial	suspicion	
to	strong	endorsement.	A	survey	carried	out	in	99	of	00	residents	
in		villages	in	the	Fujian	province	reported	that	roughly	90%	of	the	
villagers	believed	that	the	head	of	the	village	council	should	be	elected	
through	a	system	of	open	voting	and	5%	of	these	residents	wanted	
the	right	to	vote	on	issues	that	affected	their	daily	village	living.	
The	 village-level	 elections	 scheme	 seems	 to	 be	 taking	 on	 a	 life	
of	 its	 own,	matched	 --	 albeit	 at	 a	 slower	 pace	 --	 by	 government	 le-
gislation.	Recently,	 new	 laws	have	 been	passed	 regarding	 elections.	
Additional	changes	in	004	saw	the	Standing	Committee	of	the	0th	
National	People’s	Congress	pass	the	amendment	that	all	local	people’s	
congresses	at	the	township	level	should	enjoy	the	same	5-year	tenure	
afforded	to	congresses	at	higher	levels.	Furthermore,	the	new	law	sta-
tes	that	candidates	for	elections	may	be	elected,	not	only	by	political	
parties	and	organizations,	but	also	by	arbitrary	groups	of	0	or	more	
voters.	The	law	has	also	stipulated	criminal-level	punishment	for	bri-
bery	and	hampering	of	the	free	exercise	of	electoral	rights.9
7	 	Reported	in	Hong	Kong	publication	Cheng Ming,	March	99,	p	44.
	 	Zhang	Xiaojin,	“Changes	in	Peasants’	Values	During	Reform”,	Shehui	(Society),	
August	99,	p	.
9		Meng	Yan,	 “Revised	 electoral	 law	 enhances	 democracy”,	China Daily,	 7	Oct	
004.	 Available	 at	 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/004-0/7/content_
60.htm	
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Whether	 the	 idea	of	direct	political	participation	will	 spread	 to	
higher	levels	of	government	remains	to	be	seen.	However,	China’s	road	
towards	better	democratic	practice,	whether	in	the	form	of	a	growing	
civil	society,	the	establishment	of	the	rule	of	law,	or	grassroots	electio-
ns,	has	clearly	begun.	In	spite	of	major	setbacks	such	as	the	handling	
of	the	Falun	Gong	issue,	with	the	momentum	that	has	been	building	
since	reform	and	the	opening	up	of	China,	there	can	be	no	real	turning	
back	from	the	path	to	political	liberalization.
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